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iExecutive Summary
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was
adopted in 1992, and set out a framework for international policies aimed at stabilizing
the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, most notably CO2. The UNFCCC
has held six meetings of the Conference of the Parties (COP) in order to further advance
international climate policies. At COP-3, in Kyoto Japan (1997), the delegates agreed on
a Protocol to the UNFCCC. In this Protocol developed countries and countries making
the transition to a market economy committed to quantitative targets for reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions. There were 38 industrialized countries, known as Annex B
Parties, who agreed to specific emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol. The
Protocol laid out the target for each Annex B Party and set up a foundation for various
flexibility mechanisms to aid the Parties’ compliance with their assigned targets.
However, the operational details and fundamental guidelines for measuring and assessing
the Parties’ compliance were left for later COP meetings.
National delegates met at COP-6 in The Hague (Nov. 2000) to discuss the issues
surrounding the Kyoto Protocol’s implementing text, which is designed to address the
operational details of the Protocol. As the COP-6 meetings closed, no consensus had been
reached on the Protocol’s implementing text. The negotiations ended in a deadlock of
disagreements among Parties over many of the Protocol’s key issues. However, the
Parties came very close to resolution. The Parties expect to continue their progress
towards implementation of the Kyoto Protocol during the next round of negotiations,
scheduled for July 2001.
Major Negotiating Blocs
Since negotiations over the original text of the Kyoto Protocol ended in 1997, the
Parties’ approaches to climate-change policy have become increasingly different. Three
negotiating blocs have emerged from the climate talks: the European Union (EU), the
Group of 77 and China (G-77/China countries), and the US Umbrella Group nations.
Each of the negotiating blocs represents a significantly different view on the desired
climate-change policy, causing the deadlock in policy issues.
The EU views a real, verifiable cut in emissions as the only method for combating
climate change, even if there are some economic ramifications. In contrast, the G-
77/China countries and the US Umbrella Group nations have put more emphasis on cost-
efficient compliance to the Kyoto Protocol. The G-77/China countries are mainly
concerned with promoting the economic growth and stability of the developing countries
in the face of global climate change. The US Umbrella Group has been cautious about
implementing the Protocol because of the possible negative impacts forecast by
numerous economic studies. Unless compromises are made, these conflicting policy
views may undermine the implementation of the Protocol.
Dividing Issues Impeding Protocol Implementation
COP-6 was the critical deadline for the Parties to agree on the implementation
details of the Protocol. Although the delegates were able to advance the operational
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details of the Protocol significantly, the major negotiating blocs did not reach consensus
on five key issues: land use changes and forestry as carbon sinks, flexibility mechanisms,
supplementarity, monitoring and enforcing compliance, and mitigation of the adverse
effects of climate change and Protocol compliance.
First, the Parties have not reached agreement over whether or to what extent the
land use, land use-change and forestry (LULUCF) sectors can be used to earn emission
reduction units. The only agreement coming out of COP-6 was that plants and soils could
potentially act as carbon sinks since they remove carbon emissions from the air. The
question remains how much emission a proposed sink would abate, and what sink
activities to include in the Protocol’s implementing text. Also, the process of devising a
rigorous accounting system for the different types and sizes of eligible sinks has proven
to be cumbersome and has produced many heated debates.
Second, the delegates did not compromise on the issues surrounding the flexibility
mechanisms, which include Emissions Trading (ET), Joint Implementation (JI) and the
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The ET mechanism allows Annex B countries
that exceed their emission reduction targets to sell their excess emission reduction units
to other Annex B countries. Most of the ET debate has centered on the possibility that,
due to declines in economic activity, some countries could exceed their reduction targets
and sell emission reduction units without actually changing their operating practices.
These so-called “hot air units,” it is argued, would also allow wealthy nations to buy their
way out of making real domestic reductions.
The JI mechanism allows Annex B countries to fund emission reduction projects
in other Annex B countries in order to gain emission reduction units to credit against their
obligations. The debate involving the JI mechanism has mostly been over minor issues
such as who should participate and the ensuing monitoring costs, which have also come
up under negotiations for the CDM and ET mechanism.
The CDM allows project-based emission reduction agreements between Annex B
countries and non-Annex B countries. The CDM has received more attention than the
other two Kyoto mechanisms because it has the potential to serve as both a flexible
instrument of greenhouse gas reductions and as an instrument of economic development
in the developing countries. Divisions over the CDM implementing rules remain over
what types of projects to allow and how to ensure that the CDM process is efficient. The
CDM efficiency debates have centered on the monitoring efforts needed to ensure
compliance; the possibility of emission reductions from CDM projects being offset by
undetected emission increases elsewhere (leakage); the substitutability of emission
reduction units produced by the three mechanisms (fungibility); and transaction costs
associated with setting up the project-based agreements.
Third, related to the use of sinks and Kyoto mechanisms, the issue of
supplementarity was heavily debated. “Supplementarity” concerns the proportion of
emission reduction units earned from domestic cuts in emissions rather than LULUCF or
the international flexibility mechanisms. The EU proposed that at least half of a country’s
targeted emission reductions should come from actual changes in domestic emissions.
The EU’s limit on supplementarity to 50 percent has been strongly opposed by the US
Umbrella Group and the G-77/China, and has been a major impediment to reaching
consensus.
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Fourth, the delegates have not reached common ground on the terms of a
fundamental compliance system. The major negotiating issue of the compliance system
has been over the proposed consequences for non-compliance. The method receiving the
most attention is having non-compliant Parties make payments into a compliance fund to
be used to further mitigate emissions in compliance-troubled areas and areas affected by
the adversities of climate change.
Fifth, the Parties have to reach an agreement on how to deal with the adverse
effects of climate change borne by lesser-developed countries and other vulnerable
regions. Specifically, the vulnerable regions will face the direct negative effects produced
by the changing climate and the impacts of the developed countries’ responses to climate
change. The majority of the vulnerable regions have called for the Protocol’s text to
include a fund to compensate for adaptation costs, climate-related disasters, and climate-
change research. The specifics of how to finance the adaptation fund are still being
negotiated.
Wrap Up of COP-6 and Future Negotiations
Because COP-6 was thought of as the critical deadline for agreement on the
Protocol’s implementing text, the negotiating process became more heated as the
conference entered its final days. Fearing failure of the negotiations, Conference
President Minister Jan Pronk submitted a proposed document on the dividing issues,
which was to be taken seriously as an outline for reaching a compromise. After careful
consideration of the proposal and further advancements towards reaching an agreement
on the issues, the Parties had to postpone negotiations at The Hague and will re-convene
in Bonn, Germany in July 2001.
The question being raised now that the negotiation process has gone past the
critical deadline is whether the Parties will be able to meet their emission reductions
targets in the first commitment period. Even if the delegates are able to reach common
ground on the dividing issues, they will have to resolve the issues surrounding the
reasonability of implementing and meeting the first commitment period’s targets. This
process will most likely involve granting more flexibility in meeting the targets or
reissuing the targets and moving the timetables back some years. Clearly, the round of
negotiations in Bonn has the potential to either save or destroy the Kyoto Protocol.
Protocol’s Potential Impacts on West Virginia
West Virginia’s concentration in energy-related industries makes it highly
susceptible to the Protocol’s potential impacts. West Virginia will be particularly
concerned with the aspects of the Protocol that affect the US’s net domestic carbon
budget for consumption of fossil fuels, which will affect the state’s coal and electric
industries greatly. A larger US net domestic carbon budget is more advantageous for
West Virginia’s economy because there will be less substituting away from coal and
energy-intensive industries. Also, the state’s ample supply of forested land makes West
Virginia a legitimate candidate to host a significant portion of the US’s forestry carbon
sink projects. Therefore, the state will wish for unconstrained uses of the forestry sector
under the Protocol.
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Ultimately, the response of the US to climate change, as well as the response of
West Virginia, will depend on the technological advancements that occur in reaction to
the Protocol’s emission reduction targets. Also, the science of climate change will keep
expanding, and the agreements reached on how to combat climate change will continue
their progress towards consensus. The Parties will reconvene their negotiations in the
summer of 2001, with the world and West Virginia watching.
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1“Climate change is considered one of the most serious threats to the sustainability of the
world’s environment, human health and well being, and global economy. Mainstream
scientists agree that the Earth’s climate is being affected by the build up of greenhouse
gases, such as carbon dioxide, caused by human activities. Despite some lingering
uncertainties, a majority of scientists believe that precautionary and prompt action is
necessary.” 1
~Earth Negotiations Bulletin, COP-6
National delegates met in The Hague Netherlands on November 13-25, 2000 to
discuss the implementation issues of the Kyoto Protocol. The Parties convened with a
sense of urgency, each hoping to finally unite the global effort to reduce levels of harmful
greenhouse gas emissions. However, as the meetings closed on the final day of
negotiations, no consensus had been reached on the Protocol’s critical issues, and the
Parties adjourned with no concrete implementation policies. This paper analyzes the
breakdown of the latest global emission negotiations, namely the “failure” of COP-6.
Section I will present a brief history of the Kyoto Protocol and will elaborate on the role
of COP-6. Section II will present and analyze the major negotiating blocs that were
prevalent at The Hague. Section III will analyze the issues dividing the negotiating blocs.
Section IV will report on where future negotiations are headed in the remaining conflicts.
Finally, Section V will provide a discussion of the relevance of the Protocol’s issues to
West Virginia’s economy.
History of the Kyoto Protocol
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was
adopted in 1992, and set out a framework for international policies aimed at stabilizing
the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. The Kyoto Protocol identifies six
greenhouse gasses whose emissions would be restricted: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane
(CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). The ultimate goal of the UNFCCC is to prevent these
human-induced emissions from causing serious harm to the environment and the global
economy.
There is some disagreement among scientists and economists about the severity of
global warming, the impact it has on the climates of specific regions, and its associated
costs. However, there is a broad scientific consensus that, as concluded by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1995, “the balance of evidence
suggests that there is a discernible human influence on the global climate.”2  The
conclusions presented by the IPCC’s studies on climate change, encompassing the views
of many nations’ governments, have led to widespread support for international climate-
change policies.
                                                
1 For a daily summary of the Sixth Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change, visit the International Institute for Sustainable
Development (IISD), Earth Negotiations Bulletin, at http://www.iisd.ca/climate/cop6/.
2 A summary of the IPCC’s studies can be found at http://www.ipcc.ch/.
2Scientists are finding increasing evidence that continued global climate change
would have adverse effects on many regions that are vulnerable to climate disturbances.
Particularly, climate-vulnerable regions include island states, low-lying areas, and least
developed countries. These regions are directly affected by rising sea levels, precipitation
variability, extreme temperature fluctuations, and increased occurrence of volatile
weather patterns, hurricanes, and tropical storms.3
The UNFCCC has received 185 instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval,
or accession from various states, and has held six meetings of the Conference of the
Parties (COP) to further advance international climate policies. In addition to the six
conferences, the UNFCCC has sponsored numerous workshops and meetings of its
subsidiary bodies. The subsidiary bodies are split into two branches: the Subsidiary Body
for Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological
Advice (SBSTA). The subsidiary bodies convene to either advance materials submitted at
a COP or to prepare discussion texts for an upcoming COP.
At COP-1 the participants established the Berlin Mandate, which set forth the
goal of furthering global efforts to combat climate change. By 1997, following very
intensive negotiations during COP-3, the delegates had agreed on a Protocol to the
UNFCCC. In this Protocol developed countries and countries making the transition to a
market economy committed to quantified targets for reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions. The targets are set as a percentage change from a country’s base-year
emissions level and are specific for each of the six greenhouse gasses. The base year for
carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide is set at 1990, and the other three gases have
base years set at either 1990 or 1995, as chosen by each Party. Total emissions of the six
gasses are usually expressed in metric tons of carbon equivalent. Carbon equivalents are
calculated by identifying the quantity of CO2 with a global warming potential that is
equal to any other greenhouse gas, and then measuring the mass of carbon in that CO2.4
The COP-3 Protocol later became known as the Kyoto Protocol, taking on the
name of the conference’s host city in Japan. The 38 countries agreeing to emissions
targets in the Kyoto Protocol are known as the Annex B Parties and comprise
industrialized nations such as the US, Canada, Europe, Japan, and the former Soviet
Union; the remainder of the 185 Parties are known as non-Annex B Parties and do not
have assigned emission targets. The Annex B Parties agreed to reduce their combined
emissions of greenhouse gases by 5.2 percent of the recorded 1990 levels during the first
commitment period, which spans from 2008 to 2012. A commitment period is the period
of time that the Parties have to comply with their specified emission reduction targets.
Also, the 5.2 percent reduction in combined Annex B emissions is an average of the
reduction percentages realized in each year of the commitment period. In order to meet
the combined emission reduction target, each Annex B Party has agreed upon specific
national reduction targets. For example, the US target is a 7 percent reduction from 1990
                                                
3 For a more detailed discussion of the potential adverse effects caused by climate
change, refer to Wigley, Tom M.L. “The Science of Climate Change: Global and Us
Perspectives” Pew Center For Global Climate Change, 1999. http://www.pewclimate.org/
4 For further definition of carbon equivalents, global warming potential, and other related
terms, refer to the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), On-line Global
Warming Glossary http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming/glossary.html
3emission levels, while the European Union target is an 8 percent reduction from the same
base year’s level.
The Kyoto Protocol provided various flexibility mechanisms for the Annex B
Parties to use in order to make their compliance with individual reduction requirements
more cost effective. First, an emissions trading system, which allows Annex B Parties to
buy or sell emission reduction units in order to meet their reduction requirements.
Second, the joint implementation (JI) of emissions reduction projects, which gives
emission reduction units to Annex B countries that invest in projects of other Annex B
nations. Third, a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which facilitates emission
reduction agreements between Annex B and non-Annex B Parties. Fourth, mechanisms
associated with the land use, land use-change, and forestry (LULUCF) sectors, which
give emission reduction units for various methods of emission sequestration, most
notably carbon sinks. Fifth, the Parties can substitute specified reductions of one
greenhouse gas for another based on carbon equivalences. For example, if a country has
more than met its targeted reductions of methane gas, it can credit the additional emission
reduction units against its targeted reductions of nitrous oxide, based on their calculated
carbon equivalents.
Although the Kyoto Protocol laid out the targets of emission reductions for each
Annex B Party and set up a foundation for various flexibility mechanisms, the operational
details and fundamental guidelines for measuring and assessing the Parties’ compliance
were left for later meetings of the Conference of the Parties. During COP-4, held in
Buenos Aires, Argentina (1998), the delegates laid out the course of action to be followed
in order to come to an agreement on the Kyoto Protocol. This document later became
known as the Buenos Aires Plan of Action. The Plan of Action implied that COP-6
should be viewed as the critical deadline for consensus to be reached on the issues laid
out in the Protocol. The deadline was constructed so that timely emissions reductions
would be under way well in advance of the first commitment period. 5
However, the latest meeting of the Parties, COP-6, was held in November 2000 in
The Hague, Netherlands and ended in disagreements among Parties over many of the key
issues. The deadlock over policy issues has mainly been attributed to the clashing views
of three major negotiating blocs.
Major Negotiating Blocs
Since negotiations over the original text of the Kyoto Protocol ended in 1997, the
Parties’ approaches to climate-change policy have become increasingly different. Three
negotiating blocs have emerged, each representing significantly different views on
climate-change policy. The three competing blocs are the European Union (EU), the
Group of 77 and China (G-77/China countries), and the US Umbrella Group nations. The
fifteen EU member states are led by delegates from France, Britain, and Germany; the G-
77/China countries represent the developing countries of the UN; and the US Umbrella
                                                
5 For further analysis of the history of the Kyoto Protocol and other issues relating to
global climate-change negotiations, refer to “The Weathervane Guide to Climate Policy”
Resources for the Future, edited by Raymond J. Kopp and Jennifer B. Thatcher.
http://www.weathervane.rff.org/misc/weathervaneguide/index.htm
4Group nations include the US, Japan, Canada, Norway, Australia, the Russian Federation,
and Ukraine.
In the European Union, most emphasis has fallen on EU-wide compliance
measures to combat climate change, which reflects its position to promote verifiable
reductions in green house gas emissions. There has been limited formal macroeconomic
analysis conducted on how greenhouse gas reductions would affect the economic growth
and living standards of the EU and its members. Therefore the EU’s negotiating emphasis
remains on actual emission reductions, rather than on the costs of compliance. On June
22, 2000, the European Union’s Environmental Council adopted a set of conclusions for
the European community’s strategy for climate change, including setting the rules for the
different mechanisms and instruments for cutting greenhouse gas emissions in
compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. Also, The European Commission has implemented
numerous EU-level actions to begin compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. For example, in
1998 the Commission reached agreements with the automobile industry to improve the
average fuel efficiency of new cars by 25 percent between 1995 and 2008. In addition,
the EU has recently implemented a system of compulsory permit procedures for large
installations that emit greenhouse gases, guidelines to reduce member state aid to the coal
industry, limits on biodegradable contents of waste put in states’ landfills (which
accounts for around one-third of the EU’s total methane emissions), and proposals for
EU-level taxes on energy products.6 The EU views a real, verifiable cut in emissions as
the only method for combating climate change, even if there are some negative economic
ramifications.
In contrast, the G-77/China countries and the US Umbrella Group nations have
put more emphasis on cost-efficient compliance. The G-77/China provides the means for
the developing world to articulate and promote its collective economic interests and
enhance its joint negotiating capacity. The G-77/China includes most of the climate-
vulnerable regions that have limited capability for adaptation to the adverse effects
directly associated with climate change. The G-77/China also includes countries that are
vulnerable to the policy responses that are implemented to combat climate change
(policy-vulnerable regions). For example, the oil exporting countries may be negatively
affected by any policies that lead to a decrease in the world’s demand for oil, which
would seriously cripple their oil-exporting economies.
The G-77/China countries are mainly concerned with promoting the economic
growth and stability of developing countries in the face of global climate change and
responses to climate change. The developing countries are seeking negotiated agreements
on technology transfer and capacity building from Annex B countries, with emphasis on
giving financial and technical assistance.7 Specifically, the negotiated agreements will
                                                
6 For further discussion of the EU’s position on global climate-change policy, refer to
Gummer, John and Moreland, Robert, “The European Union & Global Climate Change:
A Review of Five National Programmes.” Pew Center on Global Climate Change, June
2000. http://www.pewclimate.org/projects/pol_review.cfm
7 “Technology transfer” refers to the process by which energy efficient technologies
developed by industrialized countries are made available to the lesser-industrialized
countries. “Capacity building” includes developing managerial and technical skills and
5fall under the CDM and the Adaptation Fund. The CDM facilitates technology transfer
and capacity building, while the Adaptation Fund would finance concrete adaptation
projects in non-Annex B countries, such as ensuring the avoidance of deforestation,
prohibiting land degradation, and combating desertification. The G-77/China countries
view the Kyoto agreements as a channel to bring the means of economic growth into their
borders, while implementing environmentally sound methods of production.
The US Umbrella Group nations have been cautious about the Kyoto
implementation because of the possible adverse effects implied by numerous economic
impact studies. For example, the US economy has been the subject of many economic
studies, which have allowed US policymakers to consider the estimated impacts of
emission reductions and to evaluate Kyoto policies accordingly. Most of the analyses
done on the economic impact of the Kyoto Protocol on the US economy show that the
nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) will be negatively impacted. The US Energy
Information Administration calculates that GDP losses would range from 2 percent to 4.2
percent by 2010, depending upon how much of the nation’s reductions could be achieved
by flexibility mechanisms. The estimates of subsequent job losses have ranged from 1.3
million to 2.4 million by 2010.8
Further, impact studies at the state level indicate that compliance may have
negative economic implications. For instance, West Virginia’s economy is highly
dependent on energy-producing and energy-intensive industries, such as the coal and
electric industries. The state’s concentration in energy-related industries makes it highly
susceptible to the Protocol’s impacts, so most of West Virginia’s economic indicators
have shown significantly negative responses to the modeled scenarios.9 The US Umbrella
Group nations have based their negotiating positions on findings such as these and have
adhered to the idea of promoting cost-efficient implementation rules. Simply stated, the
US Umbrella Group nations do not want to sacrifice their economic well-being in order
to comply with the Protocol’s targets.
The Kyoto Protocol impact studies predict broad ranges of possible effects and
differ greatly between study scenarios. This is because of the inherent uncertainties
surrounding the Protocol itself. The strongest sources of uncertainty are the heavily
debated rules for implementing the flexibility mechanisms, which are significant factors
in determining an area’s compliance costs. The US Umbrella Group believes that market-
                                                                                                                                                
transferring the know-how for operating and replicating the new technological systems
on a sustainable basis.
8 For a general discussion of many US economic impact models, refer to Repetto, Robert
and Austin, Duncan, “The Costs of Climate Protection: A Guide for the Perplexed.”
World Resources Institute, 1997.
9 In one modeled scenario of West Virginia’s economy, the largest estimated impacts
were: -9.9% for output and GSP in 2019; -5.5% of employment in 2014; -8.8% of total
wage and salary earnings in 2014 through 2016; and a -1.6% of per capita income in
2010. For further discussions of the impact study conducted on West Virginia’s economy,
refer to Greenstreet, David. “Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on West Virginia’s
Economy.” Bureau of Business and Economic Research, West Virginia University,
December, 1999. http://www.be.wvu.edu/serve/bureau/reports/pdf/kyoto.pdf.
6based mechanisms, which allow market forces to facilitate cooperative emission
reduction transactions, will produce the most efficient emission reductions. According to
the Group’s view, the market-based mechanisms will minimize the Parties’ compliance
costs through a competitive market regime. However, the EU argues that the market
system will have inherent flaws, such as granting emission reduction credits for projects
that merely displace CO2 emissions to other regions rather than reducing aggregate global
emissions. Another source of uncertainty comes from fact that the emission reduction
targets have only been negotiated for the first commitment period. Most of the impact
studies forecast beyond 2012, so the longer-term impact studies are very volatile.
Basically, it is unlikely that the Protocol will be adopted and implemented in its present
form, so it is difficult for impact studies to reflect the effects that will actually be felt.
In general, the disagreements among the negotiating blocs are a result of the
process undertaken to formulate the Kyoto Protocol, which involved setting the emission
reduction targets before the means of implementation were agreed upon. This has
allowed for competing interpretations of the Protocol’s outline of implementation
techniques. The EU wants to ensure actual emission reductions by making the
implementation rules stricter, while the US Umbrella Group and the G-77/China
countries want lenient implementation rules in order to meet the stringent targets. The EU
contends that the targets have already been agreed upon and relaxing the implementation
rules would compromise the targeted reduction levels. The US Umbrella Group argues
that the targets cannot be reached unless adequate flexibility is given to the
implementation rules, which they relied on when agreeing to the Kyoto targets for the
first commitment period.
Even though the US Umbrella Group and the G-77/China both have economic-
based approaches to climate change, there are still differences in their negotiating
strategies. The two groups have been at odds over implementation rules surrounding the
CDM and the Adaptation Fund. The G-77/China countries have expressed concerns over
the industrialized countries’ commitments to invest in the developing countries for
emission reduction units, saying that the agreements might not actually lead to economic
growth, while the US Umbrella Group has been skeptical about the agreements with
developing countries on the grounds that the host country might not be held accountable
for the agreed upon emission reductions. However, support of one another’s concerns is
growing in the two groups, each seeing that there are benefits for both the investor and
host countries.
Overall, the clash among the EU, the G-77/China, and US Umbrella Group has
led to the breakdown of the negotiations at COP-6. The EU, through the European
Commission, has already embraced (in principle) the near-term emission cutbacks
required by the Protocol, and has called upon other nations to start their domestic actions.
In contrast, the 1997 Byrd-Hagel Resolution states that the US Senate will not ratify any
climate policy treaty that negatively impacts US economic growth or fails to require
developing country participation in emissions cutbacks in the same time frame as
cutbacks for developed countries. 10 The 1997 Resolution embodies the views of the US
                                                
10 For a direct comparison of the US and EU negotiating approaches, see Thorning,
Margo Ph.D. “Climate Change Policy: Contrasting the US and the European Union
7Umbrella Group nations, which all promote free-market climate-change policies in order
to better ensure low compliance costs and economic stability. Also, in the spirit of
safeguarding economic well being, the G-77/China countries have formed an alliance to
ensure that the developing countries’ economies will not suffer because of the Annex B
countries’ implementation of the Protocol. Although some progress was made at COP-6,
the negotiating blocs were not able to reach agreements on several dividing issues.
Dividing Issues Impeding Protocol Implementation
The negotiating process surrounding the Kyoto Protocol has been a delicate
operation, involving many nations each trying to express its unique perspective and
concerns on various dividing issues. Because the sixth Conference of the Parties at The
Hague was the critical deadline for the Parties to agree on the implementation details of
the Protocol, the delegates entered this round of climate negotiations with a sense of
urgency. However, the conference closed without completing the Protocol’s
implementation rules. Although the delegates advanced the operational details of the
Protocol significantly, the major negotiating blocs did not come to terms on several key
issues, which left the heated negotiations in a deadlock. The delegates have scheduled
more deliberations during the summer of 2001 in order to move the Protocol forward
towards completion.
The breakdown of the climate negotiations at The Hague was driven by Party
disagreement over five dividing issues. First, the Parties have not reached agreement over
whether or to what extent the land use, land use-change and forestry (LULUCF) sectors
can be used to earn emission reduction units. The LULUCF debate has mostly focused on
the role forests can serve as carbon sinks. Second, the delegates had heated discussions
involving the Kyoto mechanisms, which were originally designed to help cut the costs of
implementing the Protocol. Issues over the Kyoto mechanisms centered on the inherent
transaction costs, monitoring efforts, leakage, and fungibility concerns. Third, related to
the use of sinks and Kyoto mechanisms, the issue of supplementarity was heavily
debated. Supplementarity concerns whether Parties, while using various flexibility
mechanisms to lower greenhouse gas emissions, should also implement domestic
methods to reach their targeted emission levels. Specifically, the delegates have not
agreed on the percent of emission reductions that should come from domestic cuts in
emissions rather than LULUCF or the international flexibility mechanisms. Fourth, the
delegates have not reached common ground on the terms of a fundamental compliance
system that determines when a nation has met its emission targets and also what
approaches to take in non-compliance cases. Fifth, the Parties have to reach an agreement
on how to deal with the adverse effects of climate change and of policy responses to
climate change that are borne by developing countries and other vulnerable regions.
The following sections will provide in-depth analysis of these five dividing issues
of the Kyoto Protocol, as of COP-6. Also, the current positions of the major negotiating
                                                                                                                                                
Approaches.” American Council for Capital Formation (ACCF) Center for Policy
Research, July 6, 2000. http://www.accf.org/ThorningEU.pdf.
8alliances will be presented where relevant, and the views of various special interests
groups will be discussed when applicable.
LULUCF: Carbon Sinks
Carbon sinks are biological or geophysical reservoirs that can absorb and store
carbon. Co2 can be sequestered from the atmosphere by increasing the capacity and
absorption rates of these carbon sinks, thus offsetting some greenhouse gas emissions.
However, discussions over the inclusion of the land use, land use-change and forestry
(LULUCF) sector in the Protocol have made no progress towards a consensus among the
delegates because of uncertainty over the effectiveness of and disagreements about the
eligibility of various proposed carbon sinks.11 During the negotiations in Kyoto, the
delegates formulated a limited list of LULUCF activities to be included in the Parties’
efforts to comply with the first commitment period’s targets: (1) growing new forests on
lands that have not been previously forested (afforestation), (2) growing forests on lands
that have been harvested (reforestation), and (3) changing forested lands into land used
for non-forest activities (deforestation). Deforestation activities are associated with
emission increases, so those activities actually decrease the amount of awarded emission
reduction units. Therefore, the Parties will want to prevent deforestation activities from
occurring in their countries.
The Protocol does leave room for other sink activities to be included in efforts to
meet emission reduction targets in the second and subsequent commitment periods.12
Also, if the Parties all agree to the inclusion of an additional sink activity, a country may
use that activity in the first commitment period, as long as the activity was implemented
after 1990. Currently the Parties are in negotiations over the inclusion of other potential
sink activities.
The largest classification of possible sink activities are those that are considered
part of the terrestrial system. The terrestrial system sequesters carbon in rocks and
sediments, in swamps, wetlands and forests, and in soils of forests, grasslands and
agriculture. In addition to the terrestrial system, there is potential for sink activities
associated with sequestration by oceanic activities, different techniques of mechanical
capture, and various forms of geo-engineering. All the proposed carbon-sequestering
techniques have been considered for inclusion in the Protocol because they remove
carbon from the air, thus affecting a potential reduction in a country’s net carbon
emissions.
                                                
11 For a scientific discussion of the LULUCF terminology and definitions, refer to the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. “Land Use, Land-Use Change, and
Forestry.” A Special report of the IPCC, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
12 For an overview of the Protocol’s treatment of the LULUCF sector activities, refer to
Schlamadinger, Bernard and Marland, Gregg. “Land Use & Global Climate Change:
Forest, Land Management, and the Kyoto Protocol.” Pew Center on Global Climate
Change, June 2000. http://www.pewclimate.org/projects/land_use.cfm
9However, the role of forests as carbon sinks seems to be the best understood by
science and appears to offer the greatest near-term potential for human implementation. 13
This, coupled with the fact that forest activity is explicitly included in the Protocol, has
put most emphasis on implementing forest activities. Discussions of additional sink
activities have mainly focused on their availability in future commitment periods.
Several questions cause division among the Parties over crediting emission
reduction units for forestry activities. First, what type of forest-sector activities should be
included: afforestation, reforestation, deforestation or other management practices, and
how can the emission reductions caused by each activity be accounted for? Second, what
time frame for projects should be eligible, precommitment-period projects or only those
enacted during a commitment period? Third, should business-as-usual or only Protocol-
motivated projects be included? Fourth, what scientific evidence supports the
effectiveness of sinks; in other words, do forests actually lead to emission reductions?
Fifth, should LULUCF activities be included in the CDM, which would expand the role
of sinks beyond the borders of the Annex B countries? Analysis of the fifth issue, sink
activity as part of the CDM, will be presented in the CDM section below and will also
include discussion on the leakage problem that may be inherent to sink activities in non-
Annex B countries.
The first dividing issue surrounding the domestic implementation of forestry
activities is over what activities to include and how to account for them. The US
Umbrella group and the G-77/China have supported the inclusion of both newly created
forests and the protection of existing or replanted forests. Specifically, the US Umbrella
Group and G-77/China are advocating unlimited use of all three types of forestry
activities: afforestation, reforestation, and preventing deforestation. In contrast, the EU
has argued for the inclusion of only afforestation efforts. However, the delegates are in
agreement over the notion that countries should lose emission reduction units for
deforestation activities. The carbon-sink accounting system for these activities is not
widely agreed upon, mainly because of the uncertainty over how much carbon a tree or
plant removes from the air.
With respect to what types of forest projects to include, there has been some
discussion on awarding emission reduction units for proper management of forests.
Human actions in managing forests can affect the growth rate of forests, and therefore
can affect the level of carbon sequestration in a given forest.14 The concept of managing a
forest as a one-time sink entails harvesting trees at a rate that is lower than the forest’s
growth rate. This would ensure that the forest was sequestering more carbon from natural
growth than it was losing from harvesting practices, so the country would receive
emission reduction units. Ultimately, since the forest is growing faster than it is being
harvested, the forest will mature, which would hold the sequestered carbon emissions for
                                                
13 For more discussion on the basic concept of sinks and possible sink activities, refer to
Sedjo, Roger A.; Sohngen, Brent; and Jagger, Pamela. “Carbon Sinks in the Post-Kyoto
World.” Resources for the Future: Climate Issue Brief #12, October 1998.
http://www.rff.org/issue_briefs/PDF_files/ccbrf12.pdf.
14 For a more detailed discussion of forest management efforts, see Sedjo, Roger A.
“Carbon Mitigation Through Forestry and Land Use: The Effect of the International
Climate Agreement on Forestry.” Resources for the Future: weathervane: October 26,
2000. http://www.weathervane.rff.org/features/feature107.html.
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some time period. However, science has shown evidence that more mature and dying
trees may release some carbon emissions, so the one-time sinks will have to be harvested
at some point. There is scientific evidence that the removal of forested material does not
necessarily result in the release of all the sequestered carbon. 15 Some of the sequestered
carbon may remain in wood products or may ultimately end up in a landfill, so the
harvesting of the more mature forests will not destroy all sequestering efforts.
In addition to using a forest as a one-time sink, forests can be managed as an
ongoing sink. If the forest is harvested at a rate that is equal to the forest’s growth rate,
the forest may never fully mature. The proper management process in this example would
be to cut the mature trees and leave the younger, faster growing trees to sequester carbon.
This is beneficial because younger trees have been shown to sequester more carbon than
older trees. However, the mature trees that are removed will have to go to final uses and
products that ensure that the release of all sequestered carbon will not occur.
Also, in relation to forest management, a country might lose emission reduction
units in the event that a large-scale wildfire destroys a significant portion of the managed
forestland. In this event, the burning forest will release all sequestered carbon, and will
not serve as a source of sequestration for the time it takes for the forest to re-establish
itself. Clearly, the accounting procedures used in the forest management process are
going to be cumbersome, and the debate over the accounting details is what is causing
most of the division between Parties over sink activities.
The second issue surrounding domestic sinks is that the delegates have not agreed
on the time frames for eligible sink projects. The EU only wants emission reduction units
to be awarded for sinks that are instituted in a given commitment period, or that are
directly linked to meeting a commitment period’s targeted emission reductions. In
contrast, the US Umbrella Group is seeking emission reduction units to be awarded for
any forests planted since 1990, the base year used in setting the emission reduction
targets. This has not only been opposed by the EU, but has also led to protests by many
US environmental groups, who fault the US for trying to exploit too many loopholes in
interpreting the Protocol.
The third issue involves the motivation for enacting the sink activity. The EU has
opposed awarding emission reduction credits for any business-as-usual activities, which
refers to activities that would have occurred without the Protocol’s targets. Instead, the
EU only supports activities that are directly attributed to meeting the Protocol’s targets.
Specifically, the EU has argued for the inclusion of only afforestation efforts on the
grounds that reforestation efforts would have occurred anyway. Also, the EU has opposed
crediting emission reduction units for protecting existing forests, because they have
already been accounted for in the countries’ emission levels. In contrast, the US Umbrella
Group contends that the business-as-usual projects, as well as the Protocol-induced,
should be accounted for and receive emission reduction units accordingly. Their claim is
based on the notion that any emission reductions should count towards meeting the
Protocol’s targets, even if the reductions would have occurred without the Protocol.
                                                
15 See Section IV.F. of Schlamadinger, Bernard and Marland, Gregg. “Land Use &
Global Climate Change: Forest, Land Management, and the Kyoto Protocol.” Pew Center
on Global Climate Change, June 2000. http://www.pewclimate.org/projects/land_use.cfm.
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Many environmental groups are concerned about the possibility that the
Protocol’s treatment of forestry time frames, types, and motivations eligible for carbon
sink activities could lead to undesirable forestry practices. If the carbon-sink monitoring
system is poorly designed, there could be market incentives to increase international
logging practices before the commitment periods, and then to accelerate environmentally
undesirable growing practices after the first commitment period starts. These undesirable
practices involve planting a single hardy species of tree that grows quickly in order to
maximize carbon sequestration, leaving many areas with a limited range of tree species.
The way the Kyoto Protocol reads now could actually accelerate forest destruction by
giving incentives to plant large-scale plantations on formerly native forest land. The
incentive to destroy old growth forests for young, genetically-engineered plantations
comes from the fact that old growth forests do not soak up as much carbon as young,
rapid-growth forests. The destruction of old growth forests will lead to the loss of
biodiversity, which will have serious global impacts.
One example of where a carbon sequestration agreement has already led to
deforestation is in the Australian state of Tasmania. Japan’s largest power utility, the
Tokyo Electric Power Company, has been blamed for destroying native forest in
Tasmania and replacing it with fast-growing eucalyptus plantations intended to gain
carbon credits under the current Kyoto Protocol. The company invested $5 million for
3,000 hectares of eucalyptus trees, which are expected to earn 130,000 metric tons of
carbon emission reduction units.16 This example is specific to the inclusion of sink
activities under the CDM. However, this type of forestry exploitation could also be
prevalent among domestic sinks. Clearly, incentives to exploit the forestry sector will be
inherent to sink activities and will need significant monitoring efforts to prevent serious
abuses.
The fourth issue involves the science behind the carbon sinks. Environmental
groups and the EU are challenging the claim that sinks will actually reduce emissions.
The green groups contend that sinks can release emissions just as quickly as they can
sequester them. This is a view known as sink “permanence.” The green groups argue that
the science surrounding sinks is not exact and should be studied in greater detail before
sinks are included in the Protocol. The EU delegates, in support of the green groups’
view, have recommended that sink projects should not be included in the first
commitment period’s available methods for attaining emission reduction units.17 The
delayed inclusion of sinks would allow the science of sinks to become more robust, and
would allow negotiations to advance the accounting procedures related to sinks.
However, the US Umbrella Group nations believe that sinks are credible mechanisms to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The US Umbrella Group argues that science has
proven that certain forests sequester significant amounts of carbon, so emission reduction
units should be given in the first commitment period for protecting in-place sinks and
promoting new sink activity.
                                                
16 For further details refer to ENN: Environmental News Network staff, “Emissions
credits: Case for Trees Isn’t Clear-cut.” CNN.com, Nov. 13, 2000.
http://www.cnn.com/2000/NATURE/11/13/.
17 See Thatcher, Jennifer B. “EU Adopts Strong Stance on Sinks and Compliance.”
Resources for the Future: weathervane: June 27, 2000.
http://www.weathervane.rff.org/negtable/eustanceforcop6.html.
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The US has estimated that it will reduce, in total, as much as 300 million tons of
carbon emissions through domestic and international forestry and land use projects in the
first Protocol commitment period. This is an amount almost equal to the difference
between what the US is emitting now and what it is committed to reduce emissions to
under the Protocol’s targets.18 The EU argues that over-reliance on sinks will jeopardize
the US’s actual emission reductions, asserting that because the science of sinks is hardly
developed it is impossible to say whether the potential emission reductions are real or
imaginary, and the US’s insistence on sinks will render the Protocol meaningless.
The only agreement, as of COP-6, was on the fact that it is possible that plants
and soil can act as carbon sinks, but that there is no clear method for estimating and
validating how much carbon is being removed from the atmosphere by a tree or forest. It
is clear that in some Annex B countries growing new forests could serve as a cheaper
method of emission reductions than implementing costly new industrial technologies.
However, the question remains how much emission a tree or forest serves to abate and
what possible vegetation to include as sinks. The delegates have so far been stuck on the
process of devising a rigorous accounting system for the different types and sizes of
eligible sinks.
Kyoto Mechanisms
Since the effects of greenhouse gas emissions are global, from an environmental
perspective it should not matter where the reductions take place. However, from an
economic perspective it does matter, because each area faces different emission reduction
costs. As its text stands now, the Kyoto Protocol provides mechanisms that generally
allow Annex B countries to meet their emission reduction targets through cooperation
with other countries with lower-cost emission reduction opportunities. Specifically, the
three Kyoto mechanisms are Emissions Trading (ET), Joint Implementation (JI), and the
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).19
Kyoto Mechanisms: Emissions Trading
Emissions trading is limited to agreements between Annex B Parties. The ET
mechanism will allow developed countries that exceed their emission reduction targets to
sell their excess emission reduction units to countries that find it more difficult or too
expensive to reduce their own emissions. The ET mechanism involves a market trading
process where low-compliance-cost countries offer emission reduction units to high-
compliance-cost countries for a price. The market price received by the low-compliance-
cost country (host) will exceed the costs incurred to produce the excess emission
reduction units. Therefore, the host country will benefit by its price-cost difference. The
                                                
18 For further discussion of the US’s intended use of sinks, see the “COP 6
Backgrounder,” Resources for the Future: weathervane, Nov. 9, 2000.
http://www.weathervane.rff.org/features/feature108.
19 For a general discussion of the Kyoto mechanisms, see Haites, Eric and Aslam, Malik
Amin. “The Kyoto Mechanisms & Global Climate Change: Coordination Issues and
Domestic Policies.” Pew Center on Global Climate Change, September 2000.
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market price will also benefit the high-compliance-cost country (buyer) because the price
incurred would be lower than the costs of making the emission reductions itself.
Therefore, the buyer would benefit by its price-cost difference.
Since emissions trading can be thought of as a transfer of emission reduction
obligations from one nation to another, the total allowable emissions in that commitment
period will remain constant. The transfer of emission reduction obligations theoretically
allows the ET mechanism to reduce the overall costs of compliance. This is based on the
lowest-compliance-cost countries meeting the emission reduction obligations through the
market trading process, while the high-compliance-cost countries merely buy the excess
emission reduction units. The areas that are most likely to host this mechanism are
located in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, because they are
projected to meet their emission reduction targets with minimal effort.
One unresolved issue about the ET mechanism is over who can participate in the
emissions trading process. Most of the US Umbrella Group nations support the inclusion
of legal entities and companies, as well as governmental authorities, in the emissions
trading process. The US Umbrella Group proposes that allowing domestic companies to
deal directly with other host companies or governments would help the efficiency of the
ET mechanism. The theory is that it would directly link the purchasers and the owners of
the emission reduction credits and would avoid costly third-party transactions. However,
since it is the ultimate responsibility of the government to meet the specific emission
reduction obligations, the companies’ transactions would have to be sufficiently
monitored. To ease the monitoring process, international “emissions brokers” could be
set up, which would specialize in trading emission reduction units. The specialization of
the brokers would ultimately help to minimize the ET mechanism’s transaction costs. The
brokers would serve as middlemen, facilitating the trade of credible emission reduction
units between companies and/or countries.
On the other hand, many of the EU nations want to restrict legal entities’ ability to
participate directly in the emissions trading process. Although the EU nations do not want
to completely restrict the legal entities’ participation, they see a greater role for an
intergovernmental trading regime.20 Their argument is that the legal entities may have
incentives to exploit loopholes, over-count emission reduction units, and ultimately
challenge the validity of the ET mechanism.
It is somewhat unclear as to which participants would produce the most cost
efficient ET mechanism, but many economic studies have shown that when a country’s
emissions trading possibilities are unconstrained, the country will face the lowest costs of
compliance. Therefore, allowing companies to participate in the trading process may be
beneficial to the Parties, if monitoring costs can be kept at a minimum and participants
have incentives to report their actions truthfully.
The ET mechanism works well under the Protocol’s current targets since the total
allowable emissions are held constant. However, one possible ethical problem that may
arise from emissions trading is that certain countries, most notably Russia and the
Ukraine, will be able to easily meet their targeted emission reduction levels and will have
                                                
20 For more discussion on the possible ET participants, see Kopp, Raymond J. and
Toman, Michael A. “International Emissions Trading: A Primer.” Resources for the
Future, weathervane, October 1998.
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large quantities of emission credits to offer to the market. The former Soviet Union
(FSU) member states had high levels of greenhouse gas emissions in 1990. However,
after the break-up of the FSU, the member states’ emissions fell sharply due to their
declines in economic activity. The Protocol’s emission targets for the FSU states in the
first commitment period are set at 100% of their 1990 levels, which the FSU states are
projected to meet without having to change their current operating practices. This means
that these states will have large quantities of emission reduction units to sell, which have
been coined “hot air” units. The EU nations are opposed to inclusion of the “hot air” units
because they are based on targets that were set above the FSU states’ current emissions.
The EU argues that since the targets exceed current FSU emission levels, the FSU states
are getting excess emission reduction units for practices that would have taken place
without the Protocol. The “hot air” units would allow other industrialized countries too
much flexibility in meeting their targeted emission levels, allowing them to avoid most
domestic reduction methods. Specifically, the wealthiest nations facing emission
reductions may elect to buy their way out of making real domestic reductions, according
to the EU nations. The US Umbrella Group Nations contend that all Parties agreed upon
the Protocol’s targets, so the emission reduction units produced by the FSU states should
be eligible for trade. The debate over the “hot air” units is not only a debate over the ET
mechanism itself, but also involves arguments about the assigned emission reduction
targets.21
Kyoto Mechanisms: Joint Implementation
The Joint Implementation mechanism acts much like the ET mechanism. The JI
mechanism allows Parties with emission reduction targets to fund emission reduction
projects in other developed countries in order to gain emission reduction units to credit
against their obligations. The difference between the two mechanisms is that the JI
mechanism offers credits to Annex B countries that invest in other Annex B countries’
emission reduction projects, as opposed to merely buying emission reduction units. There
has been some debate over who should be allowed to participate in the investment
process. As in the negotiations over the ET participants, the US Umbrella Group nations
support the inclusion of legal entities under the JI mechanism, whereas the EU nations
give more support to intergovernmental implementation. Again, the optimal participants,
from a cost-efficiency standpoint, are not clear.
Another difference between the two mechanisms is that the investment process
makes the JI mechanism more project-based than the ET mechanism. On the grounds that
countries may not want to find specific projects to fund and then have to monitor those
projects as required for joint implementation, the ET mechanism has been more widely
supported. Also, since the JI mechanisms help the investing countries meet their
reduction targets, the host country must subtract the resulting emission reductions from
its allowable emissions to avoid double-counting. This may lead to accounting
inefficiencies in the JI process, which some countries may have incentives to exploit.
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Therefore, some type of “emissions broker” or detailed accounting system will need to be
established to ensure correct crediting and deducting of the emission reduction units.
These levels of bureaucracy will affect the cost-efficiency of the JI mechanism, much as
the ET mechanism.
Kyoto Mechanisms: Clean Development Mechanism
Like JI, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is project-based. However,
the CDM has received more attention than the other two Kyoto mechanisms because it
has the potential to serve as both a flexible instrument of greenhouse gas reduction by
Annex B countries and as an instrument of economic development in various developing
countries. Also, adding to the CDM’s relative attractiveness, the current structure of the
Protocol allows CDM projects to be implemented before the other Kyoto mechanisms.
The CDM projects’ first year of eligibility is 2000, where the other two Kyoto
mechanisms’ first year of eligibility is 2008, which is the start of the first commitment
period. Although there is some debate over what CDM projects should be candidates for
early implementation, the possibility of early implementation adds to the overall
attractiveness of the CDM.
The CDM has two main purposes outlined in the Kyoto Protocol: (1) to assist
non-Annex B Parties in achieving sustainable development; and (2) to assist Annex B
Parties in achieving compliance with their quantified emission reduction commitments.
In order to achieve these two goals, the CDM can take three general forms: (1) joint
venture projects between Annex B and non-Annex B countries; (2) emission reduction
units sold by non-Annex B countries to Annex B countries; or (3) financial assistance
given from Annex B countries to non-Annex B countries through the mediation of a
multilateral institution like the World Bank.22 Within the general forms of CDM
implementation, there are many individual projects that can be mutually undertaken by
the investing Annex B countries and the host developing countries. However, the Parties
have not agreed upon a specific list of CDM project types to include in the Protocol’s
implementing text.
Annex B subsidization of nuclear power sectors in developing countries is one
specific type of CDM project that has been surrounded by debate. The international
community has supported the notion that nuclear power is a proven non-emitting
technology. However, each individual country’s opinion on nuclear power has led to
conflict. For example, France, which depends on nuclear power for 75 percent of its
electricity, has supported inclusion of nuclear power in the CDM. Splitting the EU’s
stance on nuclear power, Germany and Sweden have stuck to an antinuclear position,
arguing against its inclusion in the CDM. Many countries, including the US Umbrella
Group and G-77/China countries, do not support the exclusion of any non-emitting
                                                
22 For a general discussion of the organization of the CDM, refer to Toman, Michael,
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technologies from the CDM, so they would rather include investment in nuclear power.23
Australia supported the notion that individual host countries and developing countries
should decide whether or not to engage in nuclear activity agreements, which reinforces
the inclusion argument.
LULUCF constitutes another heavily debated sector that could be included under
the CDM-eligible projects. Many countries, especially those in the G-77/China and US
Umbrella Group, are advocating for inclusion of sink activities under the CDM. In
general, this would allow sink agreements between Annex B and non-Annex B countries.
Many of the EU nations feel that if sinks are included in the CDM, they should be subject
to the same requirements placed on Annex B sink activities. Specifically, the sinks would
be subject to the same project limitations, timetables, and other restrictions. Like Annex
B sink activity, the current text on non-Annex B sinks is not a clear-cut subject and the
debate remains over the vague scientific evidence and the loopholes that may exist in sink
implementation. The sinks’ potential inclusion in the CDM rests on the willingness of the
EU to compromise with the wishes of the G-77/China and the US Umbrella group, which
are both advocating unrestricted CDM sink activities. Ultimately, the delegates will have
to agree upon a specified list of eligible project types to be included in the CDM, which
may or may not include nuclear power investments or sink activities. With the vast range
of potential CDM projects, specifying such a list will be cumbersome.
Regardless of the CDM’s specified forms and projects, many economists argue
that the CDM, when viewed as an economic instrument, will serve as an incentive for
additional investments in the developing countries. This, in turn, will advance the
developing countries’ basic utility industries and general infrastructure, which will have a
leverage effect on the development of the host countries.24 For this reason, the CDM has
recently gained much support from the G-77/China countries, which advocate
unconstrained inclusion of all possible CDM projects in the Protocol’s text.
However, the G-77/China countries still have reason to be concerned about the
setup of the CDM. Short-term analysis indicates that by hosting CDM projects, the
developing countries could lose cheap options for greenhouse gas reductions in the
future, a hypothesis known as the “low hanging fruit” effect.25 This effect is mainly
associated with projects that involve long-term capital investments to reach short-term
carbon sequestration targets. One theory states that Annex B investors would capture all
the net economic benefits of such projects and would have incentives to over-invest in the
short run. The possible negative effects would be the largest when the host countries are
accepting projects solely to meet their own short-term economic development needs and
the Annex B investors are seeking to secure cheap host country emission reductions in
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advance of a certain commitment period. The market theory opposition states that the
cheap reduction methods should be implemented first, and the “over-investment” is
actually the correct investment level. No matter which view is taken, the Annex B
countries would invest in the cheapest opportunities for emissions reductions first. Then
the developing countries would have to implement the more costly and difficult
alternatives when they accept emissions targets in later commitment periods, which raises
more philosophical differences over the optimal investment scheme. The G-77/China
countries want the CDM to be designed in such a way that participation in the emission
reduction projects will not damage the developing countries’ economies. The US
Umbrella Group has put greater emphasis on a more free market approach to the CDM.
However, both sides see the potential to mutually benefit from implementation of the
CDM.
According to the US Umbrella Group, in order for the CDM to benefit both
Annex B investors and the host developing countries, it has to serve as an efficient
market mechanism. Resources for the Future (RFF) economist Michael Toman noted that
in order for the CDM to serve as an efficient market mechanism, there has to be trading
among business companies and non-governmental entities as well as the governments
themselves.26 Again, this raises the question of who should participate in the Kyoto
mechanisms. The EU nations, in line with their stance in the first two Kyoto mechanisms,
advocate greater intergovernmental participation, while the G-77/China and the US
Umbrella Group have argued for the inclusion of legal entities as well as governmental
authorities. In line with the relaxed restrictions, John W. Anderson, also from the RFF,
has noted that the list of eligible technologies to be included in the CDM should not be
restrictive because it would injure the host countries’ economic growth by impeding the
necessary flow of technology transfer.27 The limitations on technology transfer would
restrict supply of tradable permits that Annex B investors could acquire, which would
ultimately hurt the developing countries’ ability to induce economic growth.
In relation to the idea of market efficiency, there are four heavily debated issues
surrounding the current structure of the CDM: monitoring, leakage, fungibility, and
transaction costs. The four issues are inherently related to the fact that the current
Protocol does not include text on who should perform the tasks of monitoring and
ensuring compliance, and ultimately who is responsible for making the actual emission
reductions. The Protocol only sets regulations for Annex B countries in that they are
subject to emission reduction targets. As it stands now, the Protocol does not include
regulations on the non-Annex B countries’ emission levels. Therefore, within the CDM
project agreements, the responsibility falls on the Annex B countries to ensure that the
reductions actually take place.
Most of the Annex B countries, notably the US Umbrella Group nations, are
opposed to the host country not being held responsible for emission reductions that they
                                                
26 Toman, Michael, “Creating an Effective, Beneficial and Fair Clean Development
Mechanism.” Resources for the Future: weathervane, Nov. 20, 2000.
http://www.weathervane.rff.org/negtable/COP6/cop6_toman.htm.
27 Anderson, John W. “Details Critical to Clean Development Mechanism Success.”
Resources for the Future: weathervane, Nov. 21, 2000.
http://www.weathervane.rff.org/features/feature110.html.
18
agree upon under the CDM. Some Annex B countries claim that monitoring the host
countries’ actions would be too costly, and, as a result, an international governing body
should undertake the monitoring efforts. This again can be done through the proposed
“emission broker” system or some other kind of monitoring system. The international
body should be supplemented by domestic monitoring efforts. However, unnecessary
monitoring efforts should not be undertaken. For efficiency reasons, the CDM’s level of
monitoring and bureaucratic review has to be kept to a minimum in order to avoid costly
levels of hierarchy. Clearly the host countries will have to assume some responsibility for
the agreed emission reductions before the CDM can be realistically implemented.
If the CDM participants’ actions are not closely monitored, the CDM may have
significant leakage problems. Leakage refers to emission reduction units received by one
project in a given area being offset by increased emissions in an unregulated area. This
problem arises because developing countries’ emission levels are not restricted under the
Kyoto Protocol, so the unregulated areas are potential loopholes in the CDM process. For
example, an Annex B country could invest in emission reduction technology for a
specific industry in a region of a developing country. If the monitoring process is not
thorough, the host country could use the investment for purposes outside the realm of
emission abatement. The host country could simply scale down production in the
monitored region and heighten production in an unmonitored region of the country. Then
the host country could use the investment money for other purposes. Since the investing
country will receive emission reduction units from the host country, even if lower
production levels produced the units, the investing country will be satisfied. Meanwhile,
the emissions in neighboring regions are increased by the heightened production levels,
and net emissions may not decrease, as originally intended. In fact, if the neighboring
regions’ production techniques are more carbon-intensive than the project region, the host
countries’ total emission levels may actually increase with the CDM implementation.
However, the increased emissions would go undetected because the higher emission
levels occurred in unmonitored areas.
The leakage does not have to be specific to the regions of a given country; the
leakage may cross over the developing country’s borders. Also, the leakage will not
always be due to the actions of the host country; it may actually be induced by the
investing country’s actions. This is clearly seen with the inclusion of carbon sinks in the
CDM’s available project types. For example, if an investing Annex B country protects
one forest in a host developing country and then destroys another forest in an unregulated
developing country, the protected sink’s sequestered emissions may be offset by the lost
sequestration ability of the destroyed forest. The lost sequestration ability of the
destroyed forest may go unnoticed because the developing countries are not regulated.
Thus, the Annex B country could receive emission reduction units for actions that may
not have reduced overall emission levels.
In relation to the CDM’s inherent monitoring and leakage problems, another
debated issue has surfaced over the fungibility of the resulting CDM emission reduction
units. Fungibility refers to whether the emission reduction units created by CDM projects
are perfect substitutes for units from the other Kyoto mechanisms.28 As the Protocol
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stands now, full substitution among the different mechanisms is allowed. The US
Umbrella Group and the G-77/China countries support the idea of full substitution on the
grounds that it will produce the most economic efficiency. The US Umbrella group
contends that all the mechanisms equally aid the Annex B countries’ compliance with
their emission reduction targets, and limiting substitution between the mechanisms would
increase compliance costs and make the mechanisms less attractive. In contrast, the EU is
skeptical about the substitutability of the emission reduction units produced by the CDM
because of the leakage issues. The EU is not willing to accept perfect substitutability
unless the potential for leakage is minimized, which would require a significant
monitoring effort by the Protocol’s governing body.
Finally, implementation of the CDM will involve significant transaction costs.
The CDM will experience the usual transaction costs involved with setting up agreements
between the investing country and the host country. However, the costs may be higher
than for agreements between only Annex B Parties, because of the additional monitoring
costs associated with the non-Annex B Party involvement. These additional monitoring
costs will depend greatly on the assignment of CDM responsibilities under the Protocol’s
text. If monitoring is left up to the investing country, the Annex B countries will face
significantly higher transaction costs and may elect to avoid CDM projects on those
grounds.
In addition to the potentially high transaction costs, the Protocol has specified an
additional cost in the form of a levy placed on all CDM projects. Specifically, a share of
the proceeds from each CDM project will go to cover administration expenses and to
provide financial assistance to adaptation projects of the developing countries and other
climate-vulnerable regions.29 The exact structure of the levy system has not been worked
out in its entirety, and there was no indication that the COP-6 delegates had significant
discussions involving the structure of the levies. Instead, the discussions remained on
whether or not the levies should be expanded to the other two Kyoto mechanisms. The G-
77/China has advocated the inclusion of a levy system for all three Kyoto mechanisms,
while the US Umbrella Group nations significantly opposed extensions of the levy
system. If the levies are not extended, the CDM will potentially have higher transaction
costs than the other mechanisms, which may cause countries to shift their investments to
the ET and JI mechanisms. The possible investment distortions will be dependent on the
actual levies placed on the CDM projects; levies placed on larger shares of the CDM’s
proceeds will have greater distortionary effects on the potential CDM investment. Thus,
the US Umbrella Group is arguing for smaller levies, so that investments in CDM
projects are still somewhat attractive.
Agreements over the implementation rules of the Kyoto mechanisms will require
more deliberations by the Parties’ delegates at the climate talks scheduled for the summer
of 2001. Although, the major negotiating blocs have narrowed the gaps in their
negotiating approaches, significant divisions still exist. The most significant remaining
                                                                                                                                                
Issues and Domestic Policies.” Pew Center on Global Climate Change, September 2000.
http://www.pewclimate.org/projects/kyoto_mechanisms.cfm.
29 For more analysis of the CDM levy system see Section II.J of Haites, Eric and Aslam,
Malik Amin. “The Kyoto Mechanisms & Global Climate Change: Coordination Issues
and Domestic Policies.” Pew Center on Global Climate Change, September 2000.
http://www.pewclimate.org/projects/kyoto_mechanisms.cfm.
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division is over supplementarity restrictions on the flexibility mechanisms and LULUCF.
Supplementarity refers to the amount of emission reduction units that should be produced
from domestic emission reductions.
Supplementarity
The major negotiating blocs’ views on the Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms vary
greatly. Basically, the differences are a result of the fact that the Kyoto targets were set
before the implementation rules. The US Umbrella Group sees the flexibility mechanisms
as promoting efficiency through lower compliance costs, while the EU views the
flexibility mechanisms as cutting into the actual emission reductions. This led to the
groups supporting very different roles for supplementarity. The EU currently wants fifty
percent of emission reductions to come from domestic implementation, while the US
Umbrella Group wants relaxed restrictions on the use of mechanisms.
Specifically, the US Umbrella Group nations view the mechanisms as the most
cost effective methods of greenhouse gas abatement. They argue that the mechanisms
provide financial incentives to the developing countries to reduce their emissions and
encourage industrialized nations to invest abroad, where it might be cheaper to retrofit a
factory to save energy than it would be at home. In line with the US Umbrella Group’s
view, the G-77/China countries support the unrestricted use of the flexibility mechanisms
because the mechanism will help achieve sustainable economic growth in their
economies.
However, the European Union believes that it is unethical for industrialized
countries, like the US, to essentially buy or invest their way out of reducing their
domestic emissions. The EU nations contend that the transactions facilitated by the
mechanisms would be so complicated and filled with so many loopholes that there would
be no real reduction in emission levels.
The EU bloc wants all other Parties to agree to real, verifiable cuts in actual
greenhouse gas emissions from factories, utilities, vehicles, and other sources. The EU
strongly adheres to the belief that countries must engage in domestic implementation of
policies and measures and that there should be a concrete ceiling on the use of the
flexibility mechanisms. The current proposed ceiling is set at fifty percent, which means
that half of a country’s targeted emission reductions would have to come from domestic
actions.
The US Umbrella Group nations need the mechanisms to cut their high costs of
compliance to the Kyoto Protocol. The US, along with Canada, Australia, Norway, and
Japan, is quite opposed to the EU proposed ceilings on supplementarity. In fact, the US
policymakers have said on multiple occasions that, if allowed, they would try to meet
most of their targeted reductions by implementation of the Kyoto mechanisms.
Specifically, the US policymakers hope to use the flexibility mechanisms to meet 84
percent of their targeted emission reductions: 34 percent from the ET mechanism, 14
percent from the CDM, and 36 percent from sink projects.30 The Umbrella Group
                                                
30 For further discussion of the US’s proposed use of the flexibility mechanisms, refer to
Lazaroff, Cat, “U.S. Position Threatens to Derail Climate Change Negotiations.”
Environment News Service. November 14, 2000.
http://ens.lycos.com/ens/nov2000/2000L-11-14-06.html
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contends that well-designed flexibility mechanisms will cut the cost of reducing
greenhouse gases by allowing the marketplace to identify the most cost effective
reduction areas, thereby making efficient use of limited global resources.
Debates on the supplementarity issue continue over how much domestic action
must be mandated and what effect the mandates will have on a country’s compliance
costs. The negotiating blocs have not found an agreeable level of domestic effort because
the impacts of setting mandates are not clear-cut. One thing that is clear is that
supplementarity restrictions are likely to increase compliance costs more for some
countries than for others, which raises some equity issues.
Fundamental Compliance System
The Protocol’s compliance system should determine whether countries have met
their emission reduction targets in a given commitment period and should outline what
would be done in cases of non-compliance. The system should account for every possible
scenario and provide both facilitative functions and enforcement approaches to deal with
the various compliance issues. The key element of the compliance system is the
consequence for non-compliance. The proposed penalties include payments into a
compliance fund, extra reductions to be made in future periods, restrictions on the use of
the mechanisms in future periods, other financial penalties, and the formulation of action
plans. The alternative receiving the most attention is making payments into a compliance
fund, because those funds could then be used to further mitigate emissions in compliance-
troubled areas and to assist areas affected by the adversities of climate change. The G-
77/China has given much support to the compliance fund proposition, because most of
the areas that are directly exposed to climate-change adversities are developing countries
and small island nations.
The EU’s Environmental Ministers Council stated that there should be strict
consequences for non-compliance with the Kyoto Protocol, which should have a clear
economic impact on the non-compliant Parties. The Council’s view is that tough financial
penalties levied by an international body would help to discourage non-compliance and
help compensate for the resulting environmental damage. Also, the Council noted that the
non-compliant Parties should lose their eligibility to use the Kyoto mechanisms in the
future. The Umbrella Group’s stance on compliance is not as stern as the EU’s position.
The Umbrella nations favor financial penalties but would like to see them administered in
combination with tougher reduction targets in future commitment periods for the non-
compliant Parties.
One agreed-upon point is that an enforcement body assigned to the task of issuing
the consequences of non-compliance needs to be established. The Parties will have to
willingly yield some of their sovereignty and abide by the decisions of the enforcement
body. This leads to the issues of which parties’ interests are more important and which
Parties receive representation in the enforcement body. The developing countries, led by
the G-77/China, want equitable geographic representation, calling for each Party to have
a representative in the enforcement body. Opposing this proposition, the Annex B Parties
are seeking more influential positions for their own interests. The Annex B Parties argue
that they are the only ones facing the emission reduction targets, so their interests should
take precedence, and they should have total authority in the enforcement body.
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The final issue regarding the compliance regime is that of the compliance costs.
As it stands now, the Kyoto Protocol places no limit on the cost that a country might
incur to comply with its emission reduction targets. However, the compliance costs are
dependent on the Protocol’s treatment of the flexibility mechanisms. Specifically, more
flexibility is associated with lower compliance costs because the market process would
allow for the lowest-compliance-cost areas to meet the targeted emission reductions. It
follows that if compliance costs are significantly high due to limited flexibility and
countries are facing financial penalties for non-compliance, it may be optimal for some
countries to incur the penalties rather than face the high compliance costs in the event
that the penalty costs are lower than the compliance costs. Therefore, there has to be
some relation between the costs of compliance, treatment of the flexibility mechanisms,
and non-compliance penalty structure.
In a study conducted for the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Eric
Dannenmaier and Isaac Cohen outline the major themes that are inherent to an optimal
compliance system designed for climate-change policy. The authors emphasized the
following five themes:
(1) Meaningful compliance with climate-change commitments can best be
achieved where promises made internationally are embraced domestically, and
where participation is maximized across the broadest range of nations.
(2) National compliance systems should be promoted as a core strategy for
assuring compliance with the international climate-change regime because states
are more capable of making policy choices suited to their national needs and
priorities.
(3) Effective national compliance systems should tend to balance and combine
market-based mechanisms and incentives with regulatory models suited to
domestic priorities.
(4) Monitoring and verifying compliance will be substantially aided by using the
cooperative mechanisms of the Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol in
part to complement national data gathering and emissions estimation, and by
integrating national compliance mechanisms into the international system.
(5) Broad participation in climate-change regimes may be as important as national
performance, and any meaningful compliance system should seek to encourage
participation even as it discourages non-compliance.31
These themes all point to the widely supported belief that nationally distinct compliance
systems, which are tied to an integrated and cooperative international monitoring effort,
can promote greater participation of Parties in the climate-change regime. However, tying
domestic policies and interests to global policies at COP-6 proved to be a particularly
cumbersome process.
The majority of the COP-6 convention delegates expressed support for a strong,
sound compliance system, but when the issues came to the table, there was still some
divergence among Parties. The major points of divergence were as follows: the
differential treatment of compliance for Annex B and non-Annex B Parties, enforcement
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of non-compliance consequences, determining those consequences, the method of
adopting the compliance regime, and the composition of the compliance body. However,
most delegates seem optimistic about the resolution of these issues at the next rounds of
negotiations.
Adverse Effects on the Vulnerable Regions
The Parties of the Kyoto Protocol have essentially accepted two roles with respect
to the lesser-developed countries (LDCs), small island nations, countries with low-lying
coastal areas, and other climate-change sensitive regions.32 First, the Parties have
accepted their responsibility to help the climate-vulnerable countries fight the direct
effects of climate change. This role has drawn most support from the countries that have
significantly limited domestic capabilities to adapt to the direct changes in their climates
and environments. Second, the Parties have assumed responsibility for the actions they
instigate in their efforts to combat climate change and the effects such actions have on the
policy-vulnerable countries. The second role for the Parties has drawn the most support
from the oil-exporting LDCs, which would face serious hardships if there were an
international movement away from oil-burning technologies for less carbon intensive
energy resources.
The majority of the vulnerable regions (both climate-vulnerable and policy-
vulnerable) have called for the Protocol’s text to include a fund to compensate for
adaptation costs, climate-related disasters, and climate-change research. The Parties, led
by the concerns of the G-77/China, have answered the needs of the vulnerable regions by
proposing an adaptation fund. The adaptation fund would compensate the vulnerable
regions for both climate-related hardships, as in land erosion and weather-related
disasters; and economic-policy-induced hardships, as in deterioration of domestic
economies and the value of natural resources. The G-77/China said that the adverse
effects were dependent on the impact of severe weather events and human efforts to
prevent such weather events, so the effects could be prevented through adequate
adaptation efforts. Generally, the Parties have not argued over their role of assisting the
vulnerable regions; they have just disagreed on the method of offering assistance.
Specifically, the Parties have all, in some way, supported the proposition of the
adaptation fund. The disagreements have come over where to get the funds to assist the
vulnerable regions.
Some of the Parties, most notably in the US Umbrella Group, have called for
funding to come from the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the international entity
entrusted on an interim basis with the operation of the financial mechanisms of the Kyoto
Protocol. Canada called for the creation of a new branch within the GEF to deal
specifically with the special climate-change and policy-response issues surrounding the
adaptation fund. The United Kingdom has also voiced support for the role of the GEF,
recognizing that the adaptation fund is valuable in the fight against climate change and
calling for an improved GEF with 50% more contributions going to the vulnerable
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regions. Generally, advocates for the expanded GEF want the facility to finance the
following projects in the vulnerable regions: technology transfer and capacity building;
development of national adaptation programs; implementation of those adaptation
programs; and the establishment of an LDC group of adaptation experts.
Other Parties, like Japan, have argued for an enhanced role for the CDM to help
with the vulnerable regions. Japan contends that the Parties’ efforts should not be limited
to the GEF, and should mobilize the widest possible range of resources, which Japan
noted could be done through equitable distribution of CDM projects. In order to promote
a greater flow of CDM projects going to the LDCs, many Parties have proposed that the
levies placed on the CDM projects in the LDCs be waived. This would cut transaction
costs on the CDM projects in the LDCs, which would make them more attractive to
Annex B investors.
During COP-6, the Parties made some advances towards completion of the text
concerning the adverse effects felt by the vulnerable regions. However, more
deliberations will be needed to complete the text. The delegates will probably have to
agree upon some degree of enhancement of both the role of the GEF and the CDM in the
vulnerable regions.
Wrap Up of COP-6 and Future Negotiations
Since COP-6 was thought of as the critical deadline to reach an agreement on the
Protocol’s implementing text, the negotiating process took on a greater sense of urgency
as the two-week climate-change conference entered its final days. In the last two days of
the conference, the delegates began to fear that agreements on the Protocol’s
implementing text would not be attained. Although the major negotiating blocs had made
significant progress towards compromise on the dividing issues, an ultimate consensus
had not been reached. In fear of failure of the sixth round of negotiations, Conference
President, Minister Jan Pronk submitted a proposed document on the dividing issues,
which was to be taken seriously as an outline for reaching a compromise. President Pronk
hoped that his proposal would be viewed as a middle-ground text that addressed the
concerns of the Parties on both sides of the dividing issues. After serious consideration of
the proposal and further advancements towards reaching an agreement on the issues, the
Parties had to postpone negotiations at The Hague and will re-convene in Bonn, Germany
in July 2001.
President Pronk’s proposal included text on all the dividing issues in a final
attempt to unify the Parties’ positions on climate-change policy. Pronk’s document
touched on the adverse effects felt by the vulnerable regions and suggested that a $1
billion annual funding mechanism be included under the Global Environment Facility
(GEF) to aid these regions. However, the proposal did not include additional sources of
funds outside the GEF. The document also tried to clear up the disputes over the Kyoto
mechanisms, paying special attention to the CDM, sinks, and supplementarity.
Specifically, the proposal suggested that nuclear power should be excluded from possible
CDM projects, existing land-use projects should not be included in the list of eligible sink
projects, and Parties should achieve at least half of their emission reduction units through
domestic emission reductions. The president’s proposal also included suggestions on the
following topics: the assignment of responsibilities in achieving the emission reductions
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agreed upon in the flexibility mechanisms; the scope of the levy system in respect to the
non-CDM Kyoto mechanisms; and the compliance system and the penalties to be
assigned for non-compliance.33
The Parties reviewed Pronk’s proposal carefully and came surprisingly close to
compromise during the last hours of negotiations. However, the delegates could not get
past the last few sources of division. For example, throughout the entire conference, the
European Union and the US Umbrella Group were at an impasse over emission reduction
units issued for sink projects. By the end of the Conference, the two negotiating blocs
were no longer in serious disagreement over whether to award emission reduction units
for sinks but merely could not agree on how much to allow. The difference between the
two negotiating blocs ultimately came down to 20 million metric tons worth of carbon
emissions, which is an insignificant amount when compared to the worldwide release of
some six billion metric tons annually.34 These minor differences between the Parties’
negotiating positions have given the delegates an optimistic outlook going into the next
round of negotiations in Bonn. Even though the negotiations at The Hague did not end in
an agreed-upon text, the remaining differences should be more easily overcome by the
experienced delegates.
The issue that is receiving more attention now that the negotiation process has
gone past the critical deadline is the possibility that the Parties will not be able to meet
their emission reductions targets in the first commitment period. Resources for the Future
economist John W. Anderson noted that delegates may soon have to acknowledge that
there may not be enough time, as a matter of practical politics, to meet the targets and
timetables set down in the present Kyoto text.35 The present text sets the first
commitment period as spanning from 2008 to 2012, which would imply that the limits on
the industrialized countries’ emissions would take effect in 2008. It is argued by many
economists that there is not enough time to implement the necessary changes that are
needed to even begin to comply with the Protocol’s emission targets. The largest
impediment is the fact that the cuts in emissions are dependent on replacing large
amounts of existing capital equipment with costly lower-emission technologies. This
process will not happen overnight. The capital turnover that is needed to make the
necessary emission reductions will likely not happen until after the first commitment
period.
In conclusion, even if the delegates are able to reach common ground on the
remaining dividing issues, they will have to address the reasonability of implementing
and meeting the first commitment period’s targets. This will most likely involve granting
more flexibility in meeting the targets or reissuing the targets and moving the timetables
back some years, so that the Parties can meet their emission reduction requirements. The
process of reissuing the targets and timetables will likely be a cumbersome task and will
ultimately spur on more heated debates among the delegates. The most heavily debated
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topic may be over the possibility of adjusting the base years when reissuing the targets.
Since the gap between most Parties’ base-year emission level and their current emission
level has been widening, the Parties may want to adjust the base year to make the targets
more attainable. Whatever method the Parties agree upon to make implementation more
feasible, the round of negotiations in Bonn has the potential to either save or destroy the
Kyoto Protocol. If the Bonn negotiations do not resolve the dividing issues, the Parties
may have to abandon the Kyoto Protocol and start the climate-change policy process
over.
The one thing that the delegates will have to remember in the Bonn negotiations is
that climate change itself is a long-term problem. The Parties should not look for a
sudden agreement on the Kyoto text; they should aim for a credible, long-term solution to
climate change, even if the negotiating process is lengthened more than anticipated.36
The Protocol’s Potential Impacts on West Virginia
West Virginia’s economy is highly dependent on energy-producing and energy-
intensive industries, such as coal and electricity. The state’s concentration in energy-
related industries makes it highly susceptible to the Protocol’s potential impacts. In fact,
most of West Virginia’s economic indicators have shown significantly negative responses
to the modeling of different Protocol implementation scenarios. West Virginia will be
particularly concerned with the aspects of the Protocol that affect the US’s net domestic
carbon budget for consumption of fossil fuels, which will affect the state’s coal and
electric industries greatly. Also, the state’s wood products and forestry sectors will have
significant interests in the Protocol’s treatment of the LULUCF issues. Finally, West
Virginia will have general interest in the Protocol because of the inherent environmental
concerns that the average US citizen possesses.
The US’s “net domestic carbon budget” for consumption of fossil fuels refers to
the idea that, under the Protocol’s emission reduction targets and given the allowable
methods for compliance with the targets, the US will have a specific level of allowable
emissions. The fact that the US is subject to a carbon budget inherently implies that the
states and, more specifically, the emitting industries are subject to the carbon budget.
This means that West Virginia will be particularly concerned about aspects of Protocol
implementation that determine the US’s net carbon budget.
In a competitive market for emission reduction units, as supported by the US
Umbrella Group, a country’s carbon budget and equilibrium price for an emission
reduction unit would be determined simultaneously. The equilibrium would result from
the interaction of the demand for and supply of emission reduction units. The demand
side would rely on the country’s demand for current energy products, while the supply
would be contingent on the level of flexibility mechanisms that the country is allowed to
implement. Therefore, the level of the carbon budget will depend on the treatment of the
LULUCF sector, the Kyoto mechanisms, and the overall issue of supplementarity.
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If the LULUCF sector activities and Kyoto mechanisms are not significantly
restrained, either by the limiting of Protocol-included activities or through imposed
supplementarity constraints, the US will have a larger net domestic carbon budget. In
general, holding world emission levels constant, the US wants to make its net domestic
carbon budget as large as possible. The larger US net domestic carbon budget is more
advantageous for West Virginia’s economy because there will be less substituting away
from coal and energy-intensive industries. Specifically, the US will be able to attain
emission reduction units without having to abate costly amounts of emissions by
implementing expensive emission-reducing technologies. The US would be able to buy
emission reduction units from other sources, so the country would have more freedom in
its domestic emission levels. This would loosen the constraints on state emission levels
and the emitting industries. Also, the unconstrained flexibility mechanisms will keep the
price of tradable emission reduction units down because of the potentially large supply of
available units. As the price for emission reduction units decreases, the carbon budget
increases.
In contrast, if the activities permissible under the flexibility mechanisms are
limited, the US will face a smaller carbon budget that will put significant constraints on
domestic emission levels and will negatively affect emitting industries. Specifically, the
smaller net domestic carbon budget will lead to more substitution toward less-emitting
industries. This could have serious effects on the West Virginia economy because of the
state’s reliance on coal and energy-intensive industries, which are inherently related to
high emission levels. In addition, the constrained flexibility mechanisms will lead to
higher prices for emission reduction units. The higher price is associated with a smaller
US net carbon budget, which could cause significant tightening of the West Virginia
economy.
West Virginia’s wood products and forestry sectors will be concerned over the
agreements reached on the implementation rules surrounding the LULUCF sector. The
state’s ample supply of forested land makes West Virginia a legitimate candidate to host
a significant portion of the US’s forestry projects. Again the state will wish for
unconstrained uses of the forestry sector under the Protocol. Also, the state’s wood
products industry will wish for the accounting issues to be resolved surrounding the
forest management aspect of the LULUCF sector, so that its harvesting efforts could
achieve emission reduction units. Any emission reduction units achieved by West
Virginia’s wood product and forestry sector would bring revenues into the state because
of the price received for the units.
Ultimately, the response of the US to climate change, as well as the response of
West Virginia, will depend on the technological advancements that occur in reaction to
the Protocol’s emission reduction targets. The technological advancements may involve
alternative and more energy-efficient technologies and/or new and better-understood sink
technologies, which both should lead to reduced emission levels. The advancements will
not only be induced by the Protocol’s emission constraints, but also by the actions of
individuals who are concerned about climate change. The science of climate change will
keep expanding, and the agreements reached on how to combat climate change will
continue progress towards consensus. The Parties will reconvene their negotiations in the
summer of 2001, with the world and West Virginia watching.
